Duration and consciousness in Bergson: on the limits of scientific reduction

Abstract

This article investigates Bergson's conception of duration and its implications for the contemporary understanding of consciousness, particularly in the context of the difficulties faced by the sciences in reducing this complex phenomenon. Initially, we explore the main elements of Bergson's theory of the duration of consciousness, including its irreducibility to the corresponding brain, its continuous and progressive nature, its qualitative heterogeneity, and a succinct critique of associationism. Through this analysis, we highlight duration as a fundamental characteristic of consciousness, especially in the mind-brain interaction. Next, we raise the question: can the difficulty of contemporary sciences in reducing consciousness be elucidated by Bergson's notion of duration? While we recognize the importance of scientific advancement in this domain, Bergson argues that a genuine understanding of consciousness requires a philosophical approach, since the initial impetus for such investigation emanates from inner human experience. Thus, the question of consciousness remains not only as a scientific challenge but also as a profound philosophical problem, demanding continuous reflection and philosophical course correction from the advancements of science.