An investigation on the possibility of agency in artificial systems
Keywords:
Artificial systems. Agency. Intentionality. Autonomy. Artificial agents.Abstract
The aim of this article is to investigate, in the context of emerging information technologies, the possibility of including artificial systems in the category of agents. In order to achieve this goal, we will explain the conditions that allow an artificial system to be classified as an agent, and thus present an analysis of the concept of agency both in standard theories of action, which have the notion of intentional action as their common point, and in alternative theories of agency, which do not necessarily presuppose second-order cognitive functions. Secondly, we will examine the notion of autonomy, insofar as this is a fundamental feature of the non-trivial attribution of agency. Finally, we will try to show that artificial systems that are capable of going beyond their initial programming, in the sense that they learn from their own experience and change their course of action as a result of that learning, can be included in the category of autonomous agents under certain conditions and contexts.
References
ANSCOMBE, E. G. M. Intention. 2. ed. England: Harvard University Press, 1957.
BUSS, S.; WESTLUND, A. Personal Autonomy. In: ZALTA, E. N. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Spring 2018 Edition. Disponível em: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/personal-autonomy/.
DAVIDSON, D. Actions, Reasons, and Causes. In: Essays on Actions and Events. 2. ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002. p. 3-19.
DAVIDSON, D. Agency. In: Essays on Actions and Events. 2. ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002. p. 43-61.
DRYDEN, J. Autonomy. In: Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Disponível em: http://iep.utm.edu/autonomy/. Acesso em: 1.abr.2024.
EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Artificial Intelligence, Robotics and ‘Autonomous’ Systems. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2018. Disponível em: https://ec.europa.eu/research/ege/pdf/ege_ai_statement_2018.pdf. Acesso em: 15.out.2018.
FRANKLIN, S.; GRAESSER, A. Is it an Agent, or just a Program? A Taxonomy for Autonomous Agents. Institute For Intelligent Systems - University of Memphis. Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages. Springer-Verlag, 1996.
HALDANE, J. “In Memoriam: G. E. M. Anscombe (1919-2001)". The Review of Metaphysics, v. 53, n. 4, p.1019–1021, 2000. Disponível em: https://www.standrews.ac.uk/~jjh1/Haldob.pdf.
SCHLOSSER, M. Agency. In: ZALTA, E. N. (Ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Winter 2019 Edition. Disponível em: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/agency/.
SPEAKS, J. Davidson’s “Actions, Reasons, and Causes”. University of Notre Dame, 2009.
WEISER, M. The computer for the 21st century. Scientific American, v. 265, n. 3, 1991, p. 94-105.
WISEMAN, R. Intentional action in Anscombe’s Intention. Routledge philosophy guidebook to Anscombe’s Intention, n. 15, 2016, p. 77-111.
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2024 Kairós: Revista Acadêmica da Prainha
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
According to the Creative Commons International 4.0 License, it is possible to:
1) Distribute the published material in any format, as long as the publication and referencing credits are duly given to Revista Kairós.
2) The copyright on the articles, reviews and translations published are from Revista Kairós, as well as the rights of first publication.
3) Authors who want to publish their manuscripts published in Kairós in other media (book chapters, for example), must duly refer to the first publication in Revista Kairós.
4) Authors have full right to publish their manuscripts published in Revista Kairós on their personal pages, and it is recommended to mention the journal.
To check the provisions of the Creative Commons 4.0 License, access here.
